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A Comparative Historical Analysis of War 
Time Procedural Protections and 
Presidential Powers:   
From The Civil War To The War on Terror 
Kyndra Rotunda* 
It was a new kind of war, and the U.S. faced a new kind of 
enemy.  Clandestine saboteurs operated in the shadows waiting 
for the perfect opportunity to strike.  Our country was not secure.  
Our homeland was under siege.  Our military hunted an enemy 
it called “enemy combatants.”  It brought some of these enemy 
combatants before special Military Commissions instead of before 
civilian criminal courts.  Public debate ensued about the 
procedures that should be applied to these captured enemy 
combatants.  What was their status?  What were their rights?  
What should be their fate?  U.S. courts, including the Supreme 
Court, became embroiled in the controversy as it struggled to 
answer these questions from on-high.  The year was 1863.  We 
were at war—the Civil War. 
Some say that the issues arising in the present-day War on 
Terror are unprecedented, and that the procedures to deal with 
captured enemy combatants are novel.  In reality, there is 
nothing new under the sun.  Many of the legal issues arising in 
the current War on Terror arose over one hundred years ago, 
during the Civil War. 
This article compares and contrasts the military trials that 
brought the Lincoln conspirators to justice with the present day 
Military Commissions.  It concludes that, over time, the 
President and Congress, through statutes and treaties and 
executive orders, have created procedural rules that extend more 
rights to captured enemy soldiers today than would have been 
imagined in Lincoln’s time. 
 
* Kyndra Rotunda is a Visiting Assistant Professor of Law and Director of the 
Military Personnel Law Center at Chapman University School of Law; Lecturer, 
University of California, Berkeley Boalt Hall School of Law, former Army JAG Corps 
Officer [Major], and author of HONOR BOUND: INSIDE THE GUANTANAMO TRIALS (Carolina 
Academic Press 2008). 
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There are important differences.  From Lincoln’s time 
through FDR, Congress and the President together decided what 
those rights would be.  In modern times, the Court (even though 
it is fiercely divided) has stood firm against the President, even 
when he has the full support of Congress.  And, the more things 
change, the more they are the same.  In the military trials of 
Lincoln conspirators, and the trials of Nazi saboteurs during 
World War II, there was what today we would call “unlawful 
command influence.”  That remains true today, by people who 
claim to have the best interests of the detainees at heart. 
In discussing modern day judicial branch involvement with 
military trials, this article analyzes the role of the Supreme 
Court vis-à-vis the President during a time of war.  In 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,1 the Supreme Court 
made clear that a President’s executive authority is at its highest 
when both the President and Congress act in concert, and at its 
lowest when the President acts contrary to the will of Congress.2  
Consistent with this test, in previous conflicts, the Supreme 
Court has deferred to Congress and the Executive about war-
time procedures, especially when the two branches agreed.  
However, one unique feature of the current conflict is that the 
Supreme Court has stepped in even when Congress and the 
President were united.  Thus, in Boumediene v. Bush, the Court 
invalidated the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, which had 
established procedures for detaining enemy combatants captured 
abroad in the Global War on Terror.3 
One feature of Military Commissions that has not changed 
over the years is that Presidents have a tendency to interfere 
with ongoing Military Commissions.  For instance, during the 
Civil War, President Johnson refused to follow the Military 
Commission’s request for clemency in ordering one of the Lincoln 
conspirators (Mary Surratt) to be hanged.  During World War II, 
FDR made clear that he would execute Nazi prisoners regardless 
of what the Supreme Court decided.  These earlier interferences 
came before the Youngstown standard evolved.  But, similar 
infractions have occurred even after Youngstown.  In the current 
war, President Obama has unilaterally halted trials in 
Guantanamo Bay, which contradicts existing federal law, the 
Military Commissions Act of 2006.4 
 
 1  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 2  Id. at 592. 
 3  Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
 4  10 U.S.C.A. § 948b (West 2006). 
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According to the test that Justice Jackson’s concurring 
opinion articulated in Youngstown, President Obama’s executive 
authority is at its lowest ebb, because his decision to halt trials is 
contrary to an existing federal statute (The Military 
Commissions Act of 2006).  Yet, he has halted the trials, which 
not only runs afoul of Justice Jackson’s power analysis in 
Youngstown, but may amount to unlawful command influence. 
To see where we are today and to put the present situation 
in perspective, let us first consider the role of Military 
Commissions in the Civil War. 
I.  LINCOLN’S ASSASSINATION, BOOTH’S CO-CONSPIRATORS, 
AND THE HUNTER COMMISSION 
On April 14, 1865, actor John Wilkes Booth shouted, “Sic 
simper tyranus!”5 as he vaulted from the box seating that over-
looked the Ford’s Theater Stage.  He had just assassinated 
President Lincoln.  But, he did not act alone and President 
Lincoln was not the only target. 
John Wilkes Booth had conspired with other Confederate 
sympathizers to topple the federal government by assassinating 
President Lincoln and other national leaders, including Vice 
President Andrew Johnson, Secretary of State William H. 
Seward and General Ulysses S. Grant.6  Booth succeeded, but by 
some twist of fate, the other attackers were unsuccessful.  One 
would-be assassin, George Atzerdot, lost his nerve and retreated 
before attacking Andrew Johnson.  Another co-conspirator, Lewis 
Powell, carried out the assault on William Seward and stabbed 
Seward multiple times.  But, Seward miraculously survived.  
General Grant fortuitously canceled his plans to attend the 
Ford’s Theatre Production with the Lincolns, where he would 
have faced the same fate as Abraham Lincoln.7 
Booth escaped through the rear door of the theater, where he 
took his horse’s reins from a stage-hand named Peanuts and 
disappeared into the Washington darkness and across the 
Potomac River.8  Later, Union troops would corner Booth in a 
 
 5  W.P. CAMPBELL, THE ESCAPE AND WANDERINGS OF J. WILKES BOOTH UNTIL 
ENDING OF THE TRAIL BY SUICIDE IN OKLAHOMA, TRAVELERS SER. NO. 7 (1922), available 
at http://ia341037.us.archive.org/1/items/johnwilkesboothe00camp/ 
johnwilkesboothe00camp.pdf. 
 6  Edward Steers, Jr., Introduction to THE TRIAL: THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT 
LINCOLN AND THE TRIAL OF THE CONSPIRATORS XI, XI (Edward Steers, Jr. ed., 2003) 
[hereinafter THE TRIAL]. 
 7  Id. 
 8  HARLOD HOLZER, THE PRESIDENT IS SHOT: THE ASSASSINATION OF ABRAHAM 
LINCOLN 100, 118, 123 (2004), available at http://www.highlightskids.com/Lincoln/pdfs/ 
PresidentisShot.pdf. 
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Maryland farm-house barn and he would surrender his life for 
his crime.  Booth’s final words were, “Say to my mother that I 
died for my country.”9  But his co-conspirators would face a 
military court —a Military Commission. 
Within a few weeks of Lincoln’s assassination the 
government had arrested eight suspects.10  On May 1, 1865, 
President Johnson, by Executive Order, established a Military 
Commission to try eight suspected co-conspirators in the 
assassination of President Lincoln.11  One of them was a woman 
named Mary Surratt.12  She owned a guest-house where the 
conspirators allegedly met and hatched their plot.13 
The Military Commission that heard the case of Booth’s 
eight co-conspirators was comprised of nine military officers, 
headed by the Army Judge Advocate General (JAG).14  It came to 
be known as the “Hunter Commission,” named after its ranking 
member Major General David Hunter.15  The Commission 
established its own procedural rules with a few guiding 
principles established by President Johnson.  The President 
ordered that the “trials be conducted with all diligence consistent 
with the ends of justice.”16  The Order also required “the said 
Commission to sit without regard to hours.”17  He said the orders 
should “avoid unnecessary delay, and conduce to the ends of 
public justice.”18 
The Hunter Commission rules consisted of eleven succinct 
points that ranged from providing prisoners some procedural 
 
 9  Id. at 155; James Speed, U.S. Attorney General, Opinion on the Constitutional 
Power for the Military to Try and Execute the Assassins of the President, July, 1865, in 
THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN AND THE TRIAL OF THE CONSPIRATORS 403, 
409 (Benn Pitman, comp., 1865) [hereinafter THE ASSASSINATION]. 
 10  The eight co-conspirators were David Herold, Mary Surratt, Lewis Powell, Edman 
Spangler, Samuel Arnold, Michael O’Laughlen, George Atzerodt, and Samuel Mudd.  The 
ninth conspirator, John Surratt Junior remained at large.  Steers, supra note 6, at XII. 
 11  Proceedings of a Military Commission, May 1, 1865, in THE ASSASSINATION, 
supra note 9, at 17. 
 12  While in prison, and during the Military Commission, Mary Surratt received 
some special privileges because of her gender.  She was not shackled in court, as the other 
prisoners were, and she was allowed to choose which foods she would eat.  The male 
conspirators were shackled in court (two of them also wore a seventy-five pound ball 
around their ankles), and the male conspirators were fed only military rations.  OSBORN 
H. OLDROYD, THE ASSASSINATION OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN: FIGHT, PURSUIT, CAPTURE, AND 
PUNISHMENT OF THE CONSPIRATORS 119–20, 132 (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2001). 
 13  HOLZER, supra note 8, at 70. 
 14  Proceedings of a Military Commission, supra note 11, at 17. 
 15  See ROBERT AITKEN & MARILYN AITKEN, LAW MAKERS, LAW BREAKERS AND 
UNCOMMON TRIALS 77 (2007). 
 16  Proceedings of a Military Commission, supra note 11, at 17. 
 17  Id. 
 18  Id. 
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protections, to specifying petty details, such as what time they 
would break for lunch each day.  The rules were as follows: 
1. The Commission would convene daily at 10 A.M., recess at 1.P.M. 
for an hour. 
2. The prisoners would be allowed legal counsel, who would take an 
oath prescribed by Congress before being permitted to appear. 
3. The examination of witnesses would be conducted on the part of 
the Government by one Judge Advocate, and by counsel on the 
part of the prisoners. 
4. The testimony would be taken in short-hand by reporters, who 
would take an oath that they would “record the evidence faithfully 
and truly.”  They would also be required to swear that they would 
not communicate any part of the proceedings of trial, except by 
authority of the presiding officer. 
5. A copy of the evidence would be taken each day and given to the 
Judge Advocate General, and one to the prisoners’ lawyers. 
6. Only official reporters would be admitted to the court-room.  The 
rule specified that the Judge Advocate General would furnish 
daily, at his discretion, to an agent for the Associated Press, “a 
copy of such testimony and proceedings as may be published, 
pending the trial, without injury to the public and the ends of 
justice.  All other publication of the evidence and proceedings is 
forbidden, and will be dealt with as contempt of Court, on the part 
of all persons or parties concerned in making or procuring such 
publication.”19  [Ultimately, the testimony of three witnesses was 
taken in secret session.20] 
7. The presiding officer would furnish a pass to those permitted to 
attend the trial. No person without a pass would be allowed into 
the trial. 
8. The argument of any motion, unless otherwise ordered by the 
Court, would be limited to five minutes for each side. 
9. After the argument was closed, the Court would immediately 
deliberate and make its decision. 
10. The Provost Marshal would ensure the prisoners attended the 
trial, and would be responsible for their security.  Their lawyers 
could have access to them in the presence, but not in hearing, of a 
guard. 
11. Counsel for the prisoners would be required to “immediately 
furnish” a list of defense witnesses.21 
While the Commission allowed the defendants to have legal 
counsel, it only gave them a few days to find lawyers.  All of the 
 
 19  Steers, supra note 6, at 21. 
 20  Id. 
 21  Id. 
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defendants managed to find lawyers, but some were not able to 
appear by the time the trial started.22  These lawyers came later, 
after the trial had already begun.23 
For instance, testimony began in the trial on May 12th but it 
was not until the next day, May 13th, that Reverdy Johnson 
(counsel for Mary Surratt) appeared in court and was 
unprepared.24  He said: 
I am here at the instance of that lady [pointing to Mrs. 
Surratt], whom I never saw until yesterday, and never heard 
of, she being a Maryland lady, and thinking that I could be of 
service to her, protesting, as she has done, her innocence to 
me.  Of the facts I know nothing, because I deemed it right, I 
deemed it due to the character of the profession to which I 
belong, and which is not inferior to the noble profession of 
which you are a member, that she should not go undefended.  I 
knew I was to do it voluntarily, without compensation; the law 
prohibits me from receiving compensation; but if it did not, 
understanding her condition, I should never have dreamed of 
refusing upon the ground of her inability to make 
compensation.25 
The trial was, for all intents and purposes, secret.  The 
Commission controlled what information was released to the 
public.  Only approved reporters were allowed to attend the 
trials, and at the end of each day, the Commission specified what 
information the reporters could report.26  Additionally, the 
Commission closed the trial on three distinct occasions, to take 
testimony from three Government witnesses.27 
The Military Commission charged the defendants with 
conspiracy to murder President Lincoln, and other members of 
his administration including Vice President Andrew Johnson, 
Secretary of State William H. Seward and Ulysses S. Grant, 
 
 22  OLDROYD, supra note 12, at 127.  Mary Surratt obtained a very able defense 
lawyer, Reverdy Johnson.  He was a former attorney general, a sitting U.S. Senator and 
he went on to hold the post of minister to Great Britain from 1868–1869.  Lawyers for the 
other defendants were also distinguished.  One was a Congressman from Maryland, and 
two others went on to become judges.  Steers, supra note 6, at XVIII; Thomas Reed 
Turner, The Military Trial, in THE TRIAL, supra note 6, at XXI, XXVI. 
 23  OLDROYD, supra note 12, at 127. 
 24  See id.; Douglas Linder, The Trial of the Lincoln Conspirators 6 (Univ. Mo. at 
Kan. City Sch. of Law), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1023004. 
 25  OLDROYD, supra note 12, at 127–28 (emphasis added). 
 26  See James H. Johnston, Swift and Terrible: A Military Tribunal Rushed to 
Convict after Lincoln’s Murder, WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 2001, at F1; Trial of the Assassins, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1865, at 1, available at http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-
free/pdf?_r=1&res=9903E6DC1E3DE53BBC4E52DFB366838E679FDE. 
 27  Proceedings of a Military Commission, supra note 11, at 21 n.* (unnumbered). 
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Lieutenant General of the Army of the United States.28  The 
prosecution maintained that the Lincoln conspirators were part 
of a much larger conspiracy orchestrated by the President of the 
Confederacy, Jefferson Davis in 1864.29  It said that Davis had 
deployed Confederate Secret Service agents to Canada to disrupt 
the war efforts and demoralize U.S. citizens.  Davis’ plans 
involved attacking civilian populations, burning northern cities, 
bombing factories and ships, and using germ warfare to infect 
the civilian population.  Prosecutors presented the testimony of 
three government witnesses that linked Booth and his 
conspirators to Jefferson Davis and the Confederate Secret 
Service.30 
Although not required under the rules, the military hooded 
the prisoners with gray wool hoods that tied at their neck and 
had a small opening for their mouths.  The prisoners were 
hooded twenty-four hours a day, except for when they were in 
court and it was in session.31  Eventually (around June 6, 1865, 
 
 28  Id. at 18–19.  The charges read: 
For maliciously, unlawfully, and traitorously, and in aid of the existing armed 
rebellion against the United States of America, on or before the 6th day of 
March, A.D. 1865, and on divers other days between that day and the 15th day 
of April, A.D. 1865, combining, confederating, and conspiring together with one 
John H. Surratt, John Wilkes Booth, Jefferson Davis, George N. Sanders, 
Beverly Tucker, Jacob Thompson, William C. Cleary, Clement C. Clay, George 
Harper, George Young, and others unknown, to kill and murder, within the 
Military Department of Washington, and within the fortified and intrenched 
lines thereof, Abraham Lincoln, late, and at the time of said combining, 
confederating, and conspiring, President of the United States of America, and 
Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy thereof; Andrew Johnson, now 
Vice-President of the United States aforesaid; William H. Seward, Secretary of 
State of the United States aforesaid; and Ulysses S. Grant, Lieutenant-General 
of the Army of the United States aforesaid, then, in command of the Armies of 
the United States, under the direction of the said Abraham Lincoln; and in 
pursuance of and in prosecuting said malicious, unlawful, and traitorous 
conspiracy aforesaid, and in aid of said rebellion, afterward, to-wit, on the 14th 
day of April, A.D. 1865, within the Military Department of Washington 
aforesaid, and within the fortified and intrenched lines of said Military 
Department, together with said John Wilkes Booth and John H. Surratt, 
maliciously, unlawfully, and traitorously murdering the said Abraham Lincoln, 
then President of the United States and Commander-in-Chief of the Army and 
Navy of the United States, as aforesaid; and maliciously, unlawfully, and 
traitorously assaulting, with intent to kill and murder, the said William H. 
Seward, then Secretary of State of the United States, as aforesaid; and lying in 
wait with intent maliciously, unlawfully, and traitorously to kill and murder 
the said Andrew Johnson, then being Vice-President of the United States; and 
the said Ulysses S. Grant, then being Lieutenant-General, and in command of 
the Armies of the United States, as aforesaid.  
Id. 
 29  Edward Steers, Jr., General Conspiracy, in THE TRIAL, supra note 6, at XXIX–
XXX. 
 30  Id. at XXX–XXXV. 
 31  OLDROYD, supra note 12, at 120. 
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or roughly six weeks after their capture), the Judge in charge of 
the Military Commissions decided that the prisoners were 
suffering too greatly from the hooding and ordered the guards to 
remove the prisoners’ hoods.32 
The trial lasted for nearly two months, and included 
testimony from hundreds of witnesses.  Together, the defense 
and prosecution subpoenaed 483 witnesses and examined 361 of 
them at trial.33  The trial transcript exceeded 4,500 pages and 
stood over twenty-six inches tall.34  According to these 
transcripts, members of the Commission visited the crime scene 
where Booth shot President Lincoln.35  It also briefly recessed the 
trial in order to survey the sanity of one defendant, Lewis 
Payne.36  At another point in the trial, defendant Mary Surratt 
developed “severe sickness” and was taken from the courtroom.  
However, it appears from the trial transcript that the trial 
continued in her absence.37 
The Military Commission ultimately convicted all eight 
conspirators.  The Commission sentenced four defendants to 
prison terms and four (Herold, Atzerodt, Payne and Surratt) to 
death by hanging within two days of the verdict.38  It 
recommended clemency for defendant Mary Surratt, based on her 
age (she was almost forty-two years old) and her gender.  
President Johnson refused to grant her clemency, and insisted 
that she be hung for her role in the conspiracy.  He said that she 
“kept the nest that hatched the egg.”39 
Hours before Mary Surratt was to face the gallows, her 
lawyer filed an emergency writ of habeas corpus.  The basis of 
Surratt’s habeas petition, like petitions filed today, sought to 
defeat the jurisdiction of the Commission by appealing to the 
Constitution.  Surratt’s petition argued that she was a private 
citizen of the United States, in no manner connected with the 
Armed Forces, who had not crossed enemy lines and who had not 
 
 32  THOMAS REED TURNER, BEWARE THE PEOPLE WEEPING: PUBLIC OPINION AND THE 
ASSASSINATION OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 148–49 (1991). 
 33  TRIAL OF THE ALLEGED ASSASSINS AND CONSPIRATORS AT WASHINGTON CITY, D.C., 
MAY AND JUNE 1865, FOR THE MURDER OF PRESIDENT ABRAHAM LINCOLN 16 (T.B. 
Peterson & Bros. 1865) [hereinafter TRIAL OF THE ASSASSINS AT WASHINGTON]. 
 34  Id. 
 35  Id. at 47 (noting that on May 16, 1865, “the Court paid an informal visit, at half 
past nine o’clock this morning, to the scene of the President’s assassination.  The visit was 
made at the suggestion of the Judge Advocate-General . . . ”). 
 36  Id. at 155. 
 37  Id. at 166. 
 38  LOUIS FISHER, MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER: AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 66 (2005). 
 39  See Joseph M. Perillo, Screed for a Film and Pillar of Classical Contract Law: 
Shuey v. United States, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 915, 922–23 (2002). 
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committed any war crime.  As a private citizen, she alleged, she 
was entitled to an open public trial, before a jury, in a U.S. 
Criminal Court and not before a military tribunal.  For these 
reasons, her petition argued that the Military Commission was 
unlawfully convened and that the court could not allow the 
Commission’s judgment to stand.40 
The Court ordered the military to produce the defendant 
Surratt and answer the writ.  But, the Military did not comply 
and instead presented an Executive Endorsement, dated that 
very morning, July 7, 1865, 10.a.m., drafted and signed by 
President Johnson.  It suspended the writ of habeas corpus.41 
The Judge deferred to President Johnson’s suspension of the 
writ, stating: “This Court finds it powerless to take any further 
action in the premises, and therefore declines to make orders 
which would be vain for any practical purpose.”42  The Court 
went on to state: “The Court has no further power in the 
case . . . for if the petitioner be executed this day, as designed, the 
body cannot be brought into Court, and therefore is an end to the 
case.”43  Just a few hours later, the United States hanged Mary 
Surratt and the other three defendants.44  The executions, of 
course, mooted further appeals. 
II.  LAW GOVERNING MILITARY TRIBUNALS: FROM THE 
REVOLUTIONARY WAR TO THE CIVIL WAR 
At the time of the trial of the Lincoln conspirators, America 
was a young country, less than 100 years old.  While the country 
was young, its experience with Military Commissions was not.  It 
had previously used Military Commissions to try war criminals 
during the War of Independence.  In 1780, George Washington 
used Military Commissions (then called the “Court of Inquiry”) to 
try British intelligence officer John Andre for spying.45  
Americans captured Major Andre, who was out of uniform, 
 
 40  Fisher, supra note 38, at 209–10. 
 41 The endorsement stated: 
To Major General W.S. Hancock, Commander, &c.—I, Andrew Johnson, 
President of the United States, do hereby declare that the writ of habeas 
corpus has been heretofore suspended in such cases as this, and I do hereby 
especially suspend this writ, and direct that you proceed to execute the order 
heretofore given upon the judgment of the Military Commission, and you will 
give this order in return to the writ.  Andrew Johnson, President. 
TRIAL OF THE ASSASSINS AT WASHINGTON, supra note 33, at 210. 
 42  Id. 
 43  Id. 
 44  See OLDROYD, supra note 12, at 205. 
 45  MAROUF HASIAN, IN THE NAME OF NECESSITY: MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND THE 
LOSS OF AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 40 (2005). 
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dressed in civilian clothes, and carrying documents (which were 
stuffed inside his boots) from West Point Commandant, Benedict 
Arnold.46  The documents revealed that Benedict Arnold was 
conspiring with British Forces to surrender West Point in 
exchange for a bribe.47 
General George Washington’s fourteen member court of 
inquiry faced the question of whether to try Major Andre as a 
soldier, or a spy.48  It found sufficient evidence to treat him as a 
spy and it concluded that he should suffer death.49  Major Andre 
appealed to General Washington and urged Washington to view 
him instead as a common soldier.  Andre claimed that he had not 
been behind enemy lines, but instead was traveling on “neutral 
ground,” a fact he believed was dispositive in whether he was a 
soldier or a spy, and thereby subject to a Military Commission.50  
General Washington maintained that Andre was a spy because 
he substituted civilian clothes for his military uniform and 
adopted an assumed name.51  Major Andre was hanged on 
October 2, 178052 about two weeks after American soldiers had 
captured him.53 
General Andrew Jackson also used Military Commissions, 
both during the War of 1812 and during the Indian War in 
1818.54  Jackson imposed martial law in New Orleans, which 
included restrictions on civilians leaving the city and a curfew.55  
One defendant was acquitted by a Military Commission, in part 
because he maintained that the Commission did not have 
jurisdiction to try him because he was a civilian.  Jackson 
disagreed with the acquittal and refused to release the 
defendant.  The defendant, despite having won acquittal by the 
Military Commission, remained in jail.56 
The United States built on these historical precedents when 
it created Military Commissions during the Civil War.  
Beginning in 1863, Union forces used Military Commissions to 
 
 46  Id. at 35–40; FISHER, supra note 38, at 11. 
 47  FISHER, supra note 38, at 11. 
 48  HASIAN, supra note 45, at 40. 
 49  Id. at 44. 
 50  Id. at 45. 
 51  FISHER, supra note 38, at 11–12. 
 52  HASIAN, supra note 45, at 44. 
 53  Id. at 44 (noting that Major Andre was captured on September 21, 1780; that the 
Board of Inquiry decided to treat him as a spy on September 29, 1780; and that it hanged 
Major Andre on October 2, 1780). 
 54  John Yoo, An Imperial Judiciary at War: Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, CATO SUP. CT. 
REV. 83, 89 (2006). 
 55  FISHER, supra note 38, at 25. 
 56  Id. at 25–26. 
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try Confederate spies found in Union ranks.57  Military 
Commissions tried approximately 2,000 cases during the Civil 
War, and went on to try another 200 cases during 
Reconstruction.58 
While the notion of using Military Commissions during war 
was not unprecedented, President Johnson received criticism for 
trying U.S. civilians before military courts.59  Did not their status 
as U.S. civilians entitle them to trial before U.S. civilian courts?  
U.S. Attorney General, James Speed, prepared a legal opinion for 
President Johnson on the Constitutional Power of the Military to 
Try and Execute the Assassins of the President.60  In that opinion, 
he differentiated between open, active participants who wear 
uniforms, and secret but active participants who operate as spies 
and do not wear uniforms.  He considered open participants to be 
legitimate combatants and secret participants to be illegitimate 
combatants—”enemy belligerents.”61  It is interesting that one 
hundred forty years later, the U.S. uses the same definition, 
though some people say that the term originated with the Bush 
administration, but the history dates to the Civil War.62 
While Attorney General Speed may have been the first 
American to refer to detainees who violated the laws of war as 
“enemy belligerents” or “enemy combatants,” the notion of 
treating enemy soldiers who refuse to follow the laws of war 
differently from those who do follow the laws of war was not, 
even then, a novel concept.  To reach his conclusions, Speed cited 
to writings by Cicero and also to Wheaton’s Elements of 
International Law, which drew distinctions between legitimate 
combatants and illegitimate combatants.  Speed concluded that 
“[t]hese banditti that spring up in a time of war are respecters of 
no law, human or divine, of peace or of war, are hostes humani 
generis, and may be hunted down like wolves.”63  Though not 
required, the military can opt to take banditti prisoners and 
 
 57  Id. at 50–51. 
 58  WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 834, 853 (2d ed. rev. & enl. 
1920). 
 59  Detlev F. Vagts, Military Commissions: A Concise History, 101 AM. J. INT’L LAW 
35, 40 (2007). 
 60  Speed, supra note 9, at 403. 
 61  Id. at 404–05.  Speed also referred to these enemy belligerents interchangeably as 
“banditti,” “public enemies,” “secret foes,” and “spies.”  Id. at 405–07. 
 62  See Megan Gaffney, Boumediene v. Bush: Legal Realism and the War on Terror, 
44 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 197 (2009); Daniel Williams, After the Gold Rush—Part I: 
Hamdi, 9/11, and the Dark Side of Enlightenment, 112 PENN. ST. L. REV. 341, 408 (2007); 
Jules Lobel, The Preventative Paradigm & The Perils of Ad Hoc Balancing, 91 MINN. L. 
REV. 1407, 1420–21 (2007); Daniel Nasaw, Obama Administration to Abandon Bush term 
“Enemy Combatants,” THE GUARDIAN, March 13, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
world/2009/mar/13/enemy-combatant-guantanamo-detainees-obama. 
 63  Speed, supra note 9, at 406. 
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punish them by military tribunals for “any infraction of the laws 
of war.”64  He opined that:  
[S]urely no lover of mankind, no one that respects law and order, no 
one that has the instinct of justice, or that can be softened by mercy, 
would, in time of war, take away from the commanders the right to 
organize military tribunals of justice, and especially such tribunals for 
the protection of persons charged or suspected with being secret foes 
and participants in the hostilities.65 
He argued that Booth’s statement after assassinating Lincoln 
“sic simper tyrranis” and Booth’s dying statement, “[s]ay to my 
mother that I died for my country,” illustrated that Booth (and 
his co-conspirators) was not “an assassin from private malice, but 
that he acted as a public foe.”66 
Attorney General Speed’s opinion differentiating prisoners of 
war (POWs) and non-POW enemy combatants was not only 
backed by historical precedent, but it also reflected what was 
already actually happening on the Civil War battlefield.  General 
Order Number 100 specified that enemy soldiers captured in 
uniform were treated as prisoners of war.67  Spies, defined as “a 
person who secretly, in disguise or under false pretense, seeks 
information with the intention of communicating it to the 
enemy,” were not treated as POWs and were punishable by 
death, regardless of whether the spy successfully communicated 
the information.68  Similarly: 
[A] messenger or agent who attempts to steal through the territory 
occupied by the enemy, to further in any manner the interests of the 
enemy, if captured, is not entitled to the privileges of the prisoner of 
war, and may be dealt with according to the circumstances of the 
case.69 
Did it matter that civilian courts remained open?  According 
to Attorney General Speed, the fact that civilian courts remained 
open was not dispositive on whether Lincoln’s assassins could be 
tried by Military Tribunals.70  He concluded that military 
tribunals can operate when civil courts are open for the limited 
purpose of trying “offenders and offenses against the laws of 
war.”71  Speed explained: 
 
 64  Id. 
 65  Id. at 407. 
 66  Id. at 409. 
 67  Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United States in the Field, 
General Order No. 100, Apr. 24, 1863, § 3, nos. 49, 56, 63, in THE ASSASSINATION, supra 
note 9, at 410, 413–14. 
 68  Id. § 5, no. 88, at 416. 
 69  Id. § 5, no. 100, at 416. 
 70  Speed, supra note 9, at 409. 
 71  Id. at 407. 
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The fact that the civil courts [i.e. Article III courts] are open 
does not affect the right of the military tribunal to hold as a 
prisoner and to try.  The civil courts have no more right to 
prevent the military, in a time of war, from trying an offender 
against the law of war than they have a right to interfere with 
and prevent a battle. . . . If the persons charged have offended 
against the laws of war, it would be as palpably wrong for the 
military to hand them over to the civil courts, as it would be 
wrong in a civil court to convict a man of murder who had, in a 
time of war, killed another in battle.72 
United States Supreme Court precedent at the time 
supported Speed’s view of the issue.  In Ex parte Vallandigham, 
the Supreme Court refused to hear a case challenging the 
conviction of a U.S. citizen and resident of Ohio by Military 
Commission, on the grounds that it lacked jurisdiction.73  It said 
that Vallandigham’s petition was not “within the letter or spirit 
of the grants of appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court.”74  
The Court deferred entirely to the Military Commission, finding 
that it had no original jurisdiction to review, reverse, or revise 
proceedings of Military Commissions.75 
The defendant, Clement L. Vallandigham was a trial lawyer 
and a former Ohio Congressman.  Vallandigham’s crime was 
sympathizing with the South and uttering “disloyal sentiments” 
in a public speech.76 For instance, he called the Civil War 
“wicked, cruel and unnecessary” and said it was waged “for the 
purpose of crushing our liberty” and that it was a “war for the 
freedom of the blacks and enslavement of the whites . . . .”77 
Vallandigham ably represented himself at his trial, and 
insisted that the Military Commission lacked jurisdiction to try 
him.  He maintained that only a civilian court would have 
jurisdiction over him.78  The Military Commission disagreed with 
his argument, found him guilty, and ordered Vallandigham to be 
confined in a military prison for the remainder of the war.79  
Three days after the Commission found Vallandigham guilty and 
sentenced him, President Lincoln commuted Vallandigham’s 
sentence, and ordered his troops to release Vallandigham outside 
 
 72  Id. at 409. 
 73  Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243, 254 (1863). 
 74  Id. at 251. 
 75  Id. at 253. 
 76  FISHER, supra note 38, at 56–58. 
 77  Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) at 244–45 (1863). 
 78  FISHER, supra note 38, at 57. 
 79  Id. 
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of the Union’s military lines.80  In effect, Lincoln deported 
Vallandigham to the Confederacy. 
III.  LAW GOVERNING MILITARY TRIBUNALS: 
RECONSTRUCTION THROUGH WWII 
In 1866, the year after the Hunter Commission tried and 
convicted Lincoln’s assassins, and after the Civil War was over, 
the Supreme Court revisited the question of whether and when 
the law required civilian defendants to be tried by civilian 
authorities during a time of war.  In Ex parte Milligan,81 the 
Supreme Court drew a line to clarify which cases could come 
before Military Commissions. 
The case involved Lambdin P. Milligan.82  Union forces 
arrested him in 1864, in Indiana, for crimes of conspiracy.83  It 
charged Milligan with joining and aiding a secret society known 
as the “Order of American Knights” or “Sons of Liberty.”84  This 
secret society aimed to overthrow the government and it 
conspired with the enemy to seize war supplies and to liberate 
prisoners of war, among other violations.85  Milligan was not a 
Confederate soldier and Indiana was not at war with the Union.86  
He had not been behind enemy lines. 
Consistent with President Lincoln’s suspension of habeas 
corpus, a Military Commission found Milligan guilty and 
sentenced him to death.87  He filed for a writ of habeas corpus.  
Eventually his case reached the Supreme Court in 1866, after the 
Civil War was over.88  The Supreme Court, in a 5-to-4 decision, 
held that Military Commissions could not try civilians, who had 
not associated with the enemy and were “nowise connected with 
military service,”89 if the civilian courts were open.90  In setting 
out this distinction, the Court left open the possibility that 
Milligan could have been tried by Military Commission for his 
war crimes if deemed an enemy combatant—that is, if he had 
 
 80  Id. 
 81  Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). 
 82  Id. at 107. 
 83  Id. at 6. 
 84  Id. 
 85 Id. at 6–7. 
 86  Id. at 7–8. 
 87  Id. at 107. 
 88  FISHER, supra note 38, at 58. 
 89  Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 118–27. 
 90  Id. 
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associated with the enemy91 or if he were in some way connected 
with military service.92  The Court stated: 
On her soil [in Indiana, where the defendant was arrested], 
there was no hostile foot; if once invaded, that invasion was at 
end, and with it all pretext for martial law.  Martial law 
cannot arise from a threatened invasion.  The necessity must 
be actual and present; the invasion real, such as effectually 
closes the courts and deposes the civil administration.93 
Milligan had never been in the military, had no connection to the 
military or the state militia, and had never been in any state 
involved in the rebellion. 
The minority opined that Congress “had power, though not 
exercised, to authorize the Military Commission which was held 
in Indiana.”94  In a reference to Lincoln’s assassination and the 
conviction of eight conspirators, the Supreme Court dissenters in 
Milligan deferred to the Executive authority.  It stated that the 
Military Commission “was approved by [President Lincoln’s] 
successor [President Andrew Johnson] in May, 1865, and the 
sentence was ordered to be carried into execution.  The 
proceedings therefore had the fullest sanction of the executive 
department of the government.”95 
Congress regarded the Supreme Court decision in Milligan 
as an act of judicial lawmaking and, in 1867, responded to what 
it regarded as an activist court, by limiting the Court’s 
jurisdiction to hear cases involving military law.96 
Some commentators argue that Milligan prohibited civilians 
from ever being tried before Military Commissions, so long as 
civilian courts were open.97  Others maintain that the test in 
Milligan is not such a simple one and that it would permit the 
military to try civilian enemy belligerents before Military 
Commissions.98  Many years later, during World War II, the 
 
 91 Yoo, supra note 54, at 90 (“By implication, if Milligan had been an enemy 
combatant, not a civilian, a military commission could have tried him for war crimes.”). 
 92  Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 122. 
 93  Id. at 126–27. 
 94  Id. at 137 (Chase, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 95  Id. at 132. 
 96  Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 155, 14 Stat. 432, 433; Ronald D. Rotunda, Congressional 
Power to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Lower Federal Courts in School Busing, 64 GEO. 
L.J. 839 (1976). 
 97  See David L. Franklin, Enemy Combatants and the Jurisdictional Fact Doctrine, 
29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1001, 1028 (2008); Gregory H. Shill, Enemy Combatants and a 
Challenge to the Separation of War Powers in al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 
2007), 31 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 393, 398–99 (2008). 
 98  See Yoo, supra note 54, at 90 (“By implication, if Milligan had been an enemy 
combatant, not a civilian, a military commission could have tried him for war crimes.”);; 
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Supreme Court, in Ex parte Quirin,99 agreed with the later view.  
That is, it made clear that enemy belligerents (including a U.S. 
citizen) can be tried before Military Commissions even when 
civilian courts are open.  It made clear that Milligan is narrow. 
The Quirin Case considered whether Nazi saboteurs could be 
tried before Military Commissions.  The year was 1942, and the 
United States was at war with the German Reich.  Only six 
months after the attack on Pearl Harbor,100 eight German 
saboteurs boarded two submarines in French ports, and began 
their trip to the United States.101  Hidden under miles of dark 
water, they made the journey across the Atlantic ocean 
undetected.102  At least one of them was a U.S. citizen.103 
Their submarines came ashore in the middle of the night, 
under the cover of darkness.104  One landed in New York, the 
other in Florida.105  Each four-man team unloaded explosives, 
fuses, and timing devices.106  Some wore German uniforms.107  
They buried their uniforms in the sand, and dressed as civilians 
in order to blend-in and escape detection.108  At this point, they 
became spies, unprivileged combatants under the laws of war.  
Roving among unsuspecting civilians, they began surveying 
buildings.109  Their plan was to attack the United States, from 
within its own borders.110 
Within days of coming ashore, they contacted two 
Americans.111  They met for drinks and discussion with one of 
 
dissenting in part) (stating and explaining that the principles of Milligan do not apply 
because al-Marri “plainly qualifies as an enemy combatant.”).  See also Christina D. 
Elmore, An Enemy Within Our Midst: Distinguishing Combatants From Civilians in the 
War Against Terrorism, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 213, 221–22 (2008) (discussing proponents of 
both views).  See also Ex Parte Quirin, in which defendant Hans Haupt argued that 
Milligan stood for the proposition that his U.S. citizenship insulated him from trial before 
Military Commission.  317 U.S. 1, 45 (1942).  The Supreme Court settled that question in 
the Quirin case and decided that the Milligan case would allow enemy belligerents, who 
had taken an active part in hostilities, to face trial before a military tribunal.  Id. at 45–
46.  Therefore, citizenship and whether civilian courts were open were not dispositive. 
 99  317 U.S. 1 (1942). 
 100  On the morning of December 7, 1941, the Japanese navy launched a stealth 
attack against the United States naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, which resulted in 
the United States becoming militarily involved in World War II.  H.P. WILLMOTT, THE 
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 101  Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 21. 
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 104  Id. at 21. 
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 109  See FISHER, supra note 38, at 35. 
 110  Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 21. 
 111  See Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 5 (1945); Haupt v. United States, 330 
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them, Anthony Cramer.112  However, even years later it remains 
unclear whether Cramer knew of their plan or whether he helped 
them carry it out.  The other American was Hans Haupt, whose 
son was one of the saboteurs.113 
On the verge of their planned attacks, one of the saboteurs 
lost his nerve and decided to abandon the plan.114  He took a 
train to Washington, D.C., intending to confess.115  After a long 
wait, he met with officials at the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) and informed them of the plan.116  However, when FBI 
Director J. Edgar Hoover announced their capture, he left out the 
untidy fact that the FBI only knew about the plan because of the 
voluntary admission of one of the participants.117  Instead, 
Hoover credited the FBI’s investigatory powers for discovering 
the saboteurs.118  The trials were held in secret.119  If they had 
been public, the entire nation would have known that the FBI 
caught the saboteurs by accident.120  The Nazis would have 
known that this plan failed by happenstance, and they would 
have been more likely to try to infiltrate saboteurs again.121 
The United States tried and convicted Cramer for treason, 
but the Supreme Court later reversed that conviction.122  Hans 
Haupt was also tried.123  He had provided shelter and a car for 
his saboteur son and, unlike Cramer, definitely knew about the 
plan.124  The United States convicted him for providing shelter, 
sustenance and supplies, and the Supreme Court upheld his 
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 112  See Cramer, 325 U.S. at 5. 
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conviction.125  The government tried Cramer and Hans Haupt in 
Civilian Article III Courts.126 
The government tried the saboteurs in military courts—
including the U.S. citizen saboteur.127  The U.S. citizen (the son 
of Hans Haupt) had been behind enemy lines, unlike Hans Haupt 
and unlike Mr. Milligan.  A war crime tribunal convicted the 
saboteurs of the following crimes: (1) Violating the laws of war; 
(2) Relieving or attempting to relieve, or corresponding with or 
giving intelligence to, the enemy; (3) Spying; and (4) Conspiracy 
to commit the former three crimes.128 
On an expedited schedule, the Supreme Court decided to 
hear the saboteurs’ appeals.129  The main question was whether 
prosecutors could try the saboteurs by Military Commissions or 
whether they were entitled to trial by civil courts with all the 
rights afforded to U.S. citizens.130  FDR made his views 
abundantly clear.  He told Attorney General Francis Biddle, “One 
thing I want clearly understood” is that “I won’t give them 
up . . . I won’t hand them to any United States Marshal armed 
with a writ of habeas corpus.”131 
The Supreme Court understood FDR’s position, loud and 
clear.  Understanding that FDR planned to execute the prisoners 
no matter what decision the Supreme Court reached, it yielded to 
his view and validated the trial by Military Commissions.132  The 
Court first issued a short opinion rejecting the claims of Quirin 
and the others.133  The Court said it would write a full opinion in 
the fall, after returning from vacation.134  A few days after the 
Court issued this initial opinion, the Government executed six of 
the eight German saboteurs, long before the Supreme Court 
 
 125  Haupt, 330 U.S. at 633, 644. 
 126  Article III of the United States Constitution vests judicial power in the Supreme 
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issued its lengthier opinion.135  FDR commuted the sentence of 
two saboteurs because they cooperated with the investigation.136 
The Supreme Court upheld the convictions in a full opinion 
that it issued the next fall.137  The Supreme Court held: 
[T]he detention and trial of [the saboteurs]—ordered by the 
President in the declared exercise of his powers as 
Commander in Chief of the Army in time of war and of grave 
public danger—are not to be set aside by the courts without 
the clear conviction that they are in conflict with the 
Constitution or laws of Congress constitutionally enacted.138 
In a unanimous opinion, the Court found no such conflict.139  The 
Court determined that the President’s constitutional power to 
wage war necessarily included the power to hold war crimes 
trials, and punish war criminals.140  Further, Congress had 
explicitly sanctioned Military Commissions in its articles of 
war.141 
Aside from deciding that the President could initiate 
Military Commissions, the Supreme Court also discussed the 
specific charges brought against the saboteurs.142  Looking to 
military history, it found that wearing a uniform was central to 
lawfully waging war, and that historically spies lurking around 
behind enemy lines were put to death.143  The Court did not 
define the outside jurisdictional boundaries of Military 
Commissions, but found that clandestinely entering the United 
States to wage war, without wearing a uniform, most certainly 
violated the laws of war.144 
In Quirin, the Supreme Court revisited Milligan and 
clarified that even U.S. citizens can be brought to trial before 
Military Commissions when U.S. courts are open, if they are 
unlawful enemy combatants.145  The American citizen saboteur 
was not insulated from being tried by a military court because he 
had crossed enemy lines, which made him an unlawful enemy 
belligerent.146  His father, Hans Haupt, and Anthony Cramer 
received civilian trials because, although they aided the 
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saboteurs, they had not crossed enemy lines and thus were not 
unlawful belligerents.147  Therefore, Quirin rejected the view that 
civilians are always entitled to Article III civilian trials when 
civilian courts are open.148  It clarified the reach of Milligan once 
and for all. 
In 1946, four years after Military Commissions convicted and 
executed the Nazi saboteurs, another Military Commission case 
made its way to the Supreme Court.149  General Yamashita was a 
commanding general of the Imperial Japanese Army in the 
Philippines during WWII.  He eventually surrendered to the 
United States and became a POW.150  A Military Commission 
tried, convicted, and sentenced him to death by hanging for 
allowing his soldiers to commit brutal atrocities against people of 
the U.S. and its allies.151  On over one hundred occasions, his 
soldiers attacked unarmed civilians and POWs, and destroyed 
public, private, and religious property.152 
Yamashita’s defense at trial, and on appeal, was that he 
could not be held responsible for crimes committed by his 
soldiers.153  The Supreme Court disagreed, and determined that 
international law permits holding commanders responsible for 
“permitting [their soldiers] to commit the extensive and 
widespread atrocities.”154  Justices Murphy and Rutledge 
authored strongly worded dissents, criticizing the Court for 
permitting “revenge and retribution, masked in formal legal 
procedure for purposes of dealing with a fallen enemy 
commander.”155  They argued that General Yamashita could not 
be held responsible for acts without proving he specifically 
committed, ordered, or condoned, the atrocities.156 
Despite the spirited disagreement about whether General 
Yamashita formed the requisite criminal intent to be held liable, 
the Court reaffirmed Quirin and made clear that trial by Military 
Commission was permissible.157  It concluded that the articles of 
war, authorized by Congress, allowed Military Commissions.158  
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The Court called Military Commissions “an appropriate tribunal 
for the trial and punishment of offenses against the law of 
war.”159  It acknowledged significant judicial deference to 
Military Commissions: 
If the military tribunals have lawful authority to hear, decide and 
condemn, their action is not subject to judicial review merely because 
they have made a wrong decision on disputed facts.  Correction of 
their errors of decision is not for the courts but for the military 
authorities which are alone authorized to review their decisions.160 
Considering Quirin and Yamashita, the United States 
entered the Global War on Terror backed by significant legal 
precedent to hold Military Commissions and even to prosecute 
before military courts an “enemy combatant” who “passes the 
military lines.”161 
IV.  LAW GOVERNING MILITARY TRIBUNALS IN THE GLOBAL WAR 
ON TERROR 
After September 11th, the President ordered the Department 
of Defense to establish Military Commissions, which would try 
enemy combatants for war crimes.162  President Bush patterned 
his Order after Roosevelt’s order during WWII,163 which the 
Supreme Court had unanimously upheld in Ex parte Quirin.164  
President Bush made a few departures from FDR’s order, to give 
the detainees more rights.  For instance,  do not apply to citizens 
and the trials are public. 
Just as Presidents Johnson, Lincoln, and Roosevelt had 
issued Executive Orders during the Civil War and WWII eras 
calling for military trials, President Bush issued an Executive 
Order laying the groundwork for Military Commissions.165  
President Bush’s November 13, 2001 order instructed the 
Secretary of Defense to draft rules governing the Commissions.166  
At a minimum, the president directed “full and fair” trials with a 
Commission that decides both fact and law, admission of any 
evidence having probative value to a reasonable person, 
protection of classified information, conviction and sentence by a 
two-thirds majority, and review of the trial record by either the 
secretary of defense or the President himself.167 
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Responding to the President, the Secretary of Defense then 
drafted Military Commission Order Number One, which set forth 
Military Commission procedures.168  Section five, Procedures 
Accorded the Accused, guaranteed the accused several rights: 
 A copy of charges in defendant’s language 
 The presumption of innocence until proven guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt 
 Detailed military defense counsel 
 Access to information the prosecution intends to use at trial and 
any evidence tending to exculpate the defendant 
 Guarantees that the defendant is not required to testify against 
himself, but may testify on his own behalf (the right to remain 
silent) 
 The defendant’s right to be present except when it violates laws 
governing classified information or when the defendant is 
disruptive 
 Access to information used in sentencing 
 The right to present evidence and make a statement at a 
sentencing hearing 
 Open public trials 
 The protection against double jeopardy, i.e., prosecutors cannot 
charge defendants twice for the same crime (double jeopardy).169 
Military Commission Order Number One provided 
substantially greater procedural protections for detainees 
captured during the Global War on Terror than the Hunter 
Commission provided for Lincoln’s assassins.170  It provided 
appointed legal counsel, incorporated the presumption of 
innocence, guaranteed the guilt beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard, ensured defendants the right to remain silent, and 
protected defendants against double jeopardy (being tried twice 
for the same crime).171 
Military Commission Order Number One granted defendants 
more rights than criminal defendants presently receive in many 
European countries, which routinely accept hearsay and do not 
require proof beyond a reasonable doubt in order to convict.172  
Further, its guarantee of “open public trials” allowed more 
 
 168  U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Military Commission Order No. 1, Aug. 31, 2005, available 
at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2005/d20050902order.pdf. 
 169  Id. § 5. 
 170  See discussion supra Part I. 
 171  Id. 
 172  See generally John R. Spencer, The Concept of “European Evidence,” 4 ERA FORUM 
29 (2003). 
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protections that the Nazi saboteurs received in the Quirin, where 
the saboteurs were tried in secret.173 
In 2006, the Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld rejected 
the rules governing President Bush’s Military Commissions by 
narrowly construing Congress’ Authorization for the Use of 
Military Force (AUMF).174  It found that, as a statutory matter, 
Congress had not authorized Military Commissions,175 but 
invited Congress to authorize them: 
Nothing prevents the President from returning to Congress to 
seek the authority he believes necessary. . . . If Congress, after 
due consideration, deems it appropriate to change the 
controlling statutes, in conformance with the Constitution and 
other laws, it has the power and prerogative to do so.176 
Congress did as the Supreme Court suggested and passed 
the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA).177  The MCA 
authorized Military Commissions and codified several procedural 
protections.178  For instance, under the MCA, defendants can only 
be convicted by a two-thirds majority of the Commission and for 
sentences exceeding ten years, including the death penalty, a 
three-fourths majority is required to convict.179  The Military 
Commissions Act also adopted a robust appeals process, which 
includes an internal appeal to the Convening Authority, an 
appeal to the Court of Military Commission Review, an appeal to 
the D.C. Circuit Court, and ultimately an appeal to the U.S. 
Supreme Court.180  The Military Commissions Act of 2006 
represents another instance where both Congress and the 
President acted in concert to authorize Military Commissions. 
V.  THE SUPREME COURT, CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT DURING 
A TIME OF WAR 
A brief walk through time reveals that significant historical 
precedent dating back to the Revolutionary War supports using 
Military Commissions.  It also reveals, not surprisingly, that the 
procedural protections have evolved to provide substantially 
more due process over time.  The Hunter Commission seemed 
 
 173  See Lane, supra note 119. 
 174  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 593–95 (2006). 
 175  Id.; see also Glenn Sulmasy, John Yoo & Martin Flaherty, Debate, Hamdan and 
the Military Commissions Act, 155 U. PA. L. REV. (PENNUMBRA) 146, 146–47 (2007), 
http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/sulmasy_yooflaherty.pdf. 
 176  Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 636–37 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part). 
 177  Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a–950p (Supp. 
2008)). 
 178  10 U.S.C. § 948b(a)–(f) (Supp. 2008). 
 179  Id. § 949m(a), (b)(2). 
 180  Id. §§ 950d(b)–(d), 950g. 
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more concerned with efficiency than with affording due process.  
FDR granted more rights than the Hunter Commission offered.  
The Military Commissions Act of 2006 incorporated fundamental 
procedural protections, including the right to remain silent and 
protection against double jeopardy.181 
In all of the incidents discussed above, the President and 
Congress acted in concert.  But, does it matter?  Is it relevant 
that both democratic branches of government agree on the proper 
course of action?  The Supreme Court answered these questions 
in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.182 
The year was 1951 and the U.S. was embroiled in the Korean 
War.  At the same time, steel companies were in a dispute with 
their employees.  Being unable to reach a resolution, the Steel 
Union announced a nationwide strike, which would halt steel 
production.183  President Truman responded by issuing Executive 
Order 10340, which directed the Secretary of Commerce to 
possess and operate various steel mills around the United 
States.184  Based on the fact that steel was necessary for weapons 
and other war materials, the President considered it within his 
role as Commander in Chief to keep the steel mills operational.185 
The steel companies filed suit in the District Court, claiming 
that the President lacked authority to seize the steel mills and 
that the seizure was not authorized by Congress.186  Writing for 
the Supreme Court, Justice Black concluded, in a pithy opinion, 
that the President’s actions were not sanctioned by Congress and 
were not specifically authorized by the Constitution.187  It said 
that seizing private property to ensure continuing production “is 
a job for the Nation’s lawmakers, not for its military 
authorities.”188 
Justice Jackson filed a separate concurring opinion,189 which 
explored the contours of Presidential power and presented the 
notion that, in each instance, Presidential Power is either 
strengthened or weakened by whether Congress agrees or 
disagrees.  Jackson said that the President’s “powers are not 
fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or 
 
 181  See id. §§ 948r, 949h. 
 182  343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 183  Youngstown at 582–83. 
 184  Id. at 583. 
 185  Id. at 582. 
 186  Id. at 583. 
 187  Id. at 586–87. 
 188  Id. at 587. 
 189  Id. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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conjunction with those of Congress.”190  Justice Jackson created 
three groupings to express the notion of progressive Presidential 
power.191 
In the first grouping, the President’s power is at its height 
when he acts in accordance with Congress, whether express or 
implied.  In this instance, his power includes “all that he posses 
in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate.”192  In the 
second grouping, Congress is silent and neither affirms nor 
denies his authority, leaving the President with only his 
specified, independent powers.  Justice Jackson explained that 
“there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have 
concurrent authority or in which its distribution is uncertain.”193  
When Congress fails or refuses to act, the President’s actual 
power depends on the circumstances—”imperatives of events and 
contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of 
law.”194  In the third grouping, the President acts against the 
express or implied will of Congress.  In this instance, his power is 
at its “lowest ebb” and “he can rely only upon his own 
constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of 
Congress over the matter.”195  Presidential claim to power in this 
instance must be “scrutinized with caution” because the balance 
of power is at stake.196 
Justice Jackson placed the President’s steel seizure in group 
three, because President Truman acted contrary to the will of 
Congress.197  He concluded that the President’s powers as 
Commander in Chief were not large enough to encompass 
controlling internal affairs of the country, including seizing the 
steel mills,198 particularly because the Constitution delegates to 
Congress the power to “raise and support Armies” and to “provide 
and maintain a Navy” that leaves Congress, not the President, 
with the burden of supplying the armed forces.199  In this case, 
Congress specified procedures for seizing private property; and 
the President, without any authority, flouted those procedures.200  
For these reasons, the Supreme Court did not sanction the 
President’s decision to seize the steel mills.201 
 
 190  Id. at 635. 
 191  Id. at 635–38. 
 192  Id. at 635. 
 193  Id. at 637. 
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 196  Id. at 638. 
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The Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld adopted Justice 
Jackson’s opinion in Youngstown, and reiterated that a 
President’s authority is “at its maximum” when he acts in concert 
with Congress and at its “lowest ebb” when he acts incompatibly 
with Congress.202  In 2008, the Supreme Court again reaffirmed 
Youngstown’s twilight analysis in Medellin v. Texas,203 quoting 
from Youngstown: “[w]hen the President takes measures 
incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his 
power is at its lowest ebb.”204  It went on to say, “The President’s 
authority to act must come from an act of Congress or the 
Constitution itself.”205  Both Hamdan and Medellin make clear 
that the twilight analysis in Youngstown is still the law today. 
But, sandwiched between Hamdan and Medellin, is 
Boumediene v. Bush, where a divided Supreme Court did not 
follow the Youngstown analysis but instead invalidated a joint 
war time decision by Congress and the President.206 
The Boumediene case concerned the Detainee Treatment Act 
of 2005 (“DTA”), a set of procedures passed by Congress that 
governed status hearings of detainees captured abroad in the 
War on Terror.207  The DTA gave the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit “exclusive jurisdiction” to review the 
Military’s Combatant Status Review Tribunals (“CSRTs”).208  In 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court held that the DTA did 
not apply to pending cases.209  Congress responded to Hamdan by 
amending the law to clarify that it did apply to pending cases.210  
That is, Congress made clear that the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit, and only the Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit would have jurisdiction to hear 
CSRT appeals stemming back to September 11, 2001.211 
Rejecting the judgment of Congress and the Executive, the 
Supreme Court in Boumediene invalidated the DTA.  But the 
Court was sharply divided.  The dissent criticized the Court for 
decreeing that there was “no good reason to accept the judgment 
of the other two branches” and it argued that the court was not 
competent to “second-guess the judgment of Congress and the 
 
 202  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 638 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part). 
 203  Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008). 
 204  Id. at 1368. 
 205  Id. 
 206  Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
 207  Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005) 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. 2241). 
 208  Id. 
 209  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
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President.”212  It went on to opine that the Court “must leave 
undisturbed the considered judgment of the coequal branches.”213  
In Boumediene, the Court stood firm against the other two 
branches of government, and to Justice Jackson’s test articulated 
in Youngstown. 
VI.  PRESIDENTIAL ORDERS IN THE CONTEXT OF QUIRIN, 
YOUNGSTOWN, HAMDAN & BOUMEDIENE 
In November 2008, Barack Obama was elected President of 
the United States.  On January 22, 2009, shortly after taking 
office, President Obama issued an Executive Order closing 
(eventually) the United States military detention facility at 
Guantanamo Bay and halting the Military Commissions 
presently underway.214  His order called for a committee to 
review whether and how the detainees should be prosecuted.215  
The Executive Order declares that it “shall be implemented 
consistent with applicable law.”216  However, the present Military 
Commissions are not a creature of the Executive Branch.  They 
exist in the present format because of an act of Congress.217  The 
new Presidential Order commands the impossible.  How can an 
order to disregard a federal law be consistent with that law? 
The twilight zone test set out in Justice Jackson’s concurring 
opinion in Youngstown, and adopted in Hamdan and Medellin, 
makes clear that the President may not unilaterally stop Military 
Commissions and craft his own, novel procedures, outside of the 
democratic process.  Because Congress has already spoken, and 
has passed a federal statute that governs Military Commissions, 
the President’s power is at its “lowest ebb.”  When President 
Truman unconstitutionally refused to follow the Taft Hartley 
Act, and attempted to substitute his own procedures,218 the Court 
enjoined Truman’s attempted seizure of the steel mills.  
 
 212  Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2296 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 213  Id. at 2297. 
 214  Exec. Order No. 13492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 22, 2009), available at 
http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2009/pdf/E9-1893.pdf. 
 215  Id. § 4(c)(3): 
Determination of Prosecution.  In accordance with United States law, the cases 
of individuals detained at Guantánamo not approved for release or transfer 
shall be evaluated to determine whether the Federal Government should seek 
to prosecute the detained individuals for any offenses they may have 
committed, including whether it is feasible to prosecute such individuals before 
a court established pursuant to Article III of the United States Constitution, 
and the Review participants shall in turn take the necessary and appropriate 
steps based on such determinations. 
 216  Id. § 8(b). 
       217     Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600. 
 218  See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
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President Obama now refuses to follow the Military Commissions 
Act, and substitute his own, yet to be determined, procedures.  
The problem is that a federal statute already governs these 
procedures. 
Justice Burton’s concurrence in Youngstown reflected Justice 
Jackson’s twilight zone analysis.  Burton observed that “[i]n the 
case before us, Congress authorized a procedure which the 
President declined to follow.”219  Justice Burton further stated 
that “[t]he controlling fact here is that Congress, within its 
constitutionally delegated power, has prescribed for the 
President specific procedures, exclusive of seizure, for his use in 
meeting the present type of emergency.”220  He went on to 
conclude that, under those circumstances, the President’s order 
“invaded the jurisdiction of Congress.  It violated the essence of 
the principle of the separation of governmental powers.”221  
President Obama’s Order halting Military Commissions does the 
same thing and should receive the same treatment as President 
Truman’s Executive Order. 
President Truman’s steel seizure case involved private 
property.  The seizures impacted U.S. citizens and were not akin 
to decisions made on the battlefield.  Yet those factual 
distinctions are constitutionally irrelevant.  Can the President’s 
power as Commander in Chief override a specific federal statute 
that governs how the President can conduct Military 
Commissions?  The President does not have more authority 
under his Commander in Chief role to act contrary to federal 
statute when it comes to holding Military Commissions in a time 
of war.  In Youngstown, the Court acknowledged a long line of 
cases that upheld “broad powers” for Commanders during a time 
of war.222  But, it distinguished those cases: 
Such cases need not concern us here.  Even though “theatre of war” be 
an expanding concept, we cannot with faithfulness to our 
constitutional system hold that the Commander in Chief of the Armed 
Forces has the ultimate power as such to take possession of private 
property in order to keep labor disputes from stopping production.223 
Under Quirin, Yamashita and Youngstown, the Commander 
in Chief’s role during an active war was expansive.  However, the 
Supreme Court in Hamdan found that the Youngstown twilight 
analysis does apply to a President’s decision to hold Military 
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ROTUNDA 10/14/2009 6:37 PM 
2009] From The Civil War To The War on Terror 477 
Commissions during war-time.224  It said that President Bush’s 
Executive Order calling for Military Commissions (which was 
identical to FDR’s order in Quirin) now required specific 
Congressional endorsement.225  It found that Congress’s 
Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) did not 
clearly grant authority for Military Commissions.226  As noted 
above, the Hamdan case led to Congress to enact the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006.  That law consequently ties the hands 
of the Commander in Chief.  That is why President Obama 
cannot waive away the statute by issuing an Executive Order. 
Before Hamdan, no Congressional statute existed that 
governed Military Commissions; Quirin was the law, and it 
accepted that the establishment of Military Commissions was 
within the President’s discretion.  After Hamdan, however, 
Congress drafted a federal law governing Military Commissions 
in the Global War on Terror.  Given Youngstown’s twilight 
analysis, President Obama’s power to adopt rules for Military 
Commissions inconsistent with the Military Commissions Act is 
now at its lowest ebb.  The Court has never invalidated the 
Military Commissions Act. 
While the Supreme Court has definitely pruned the 
Commander in Chief’s power during a time of war, it has not left 
President Obama without a remedy.  When the U.S. entered the 
War on Terror in 2001, Quirin was the law, and the President 
enjoyed extensive war time power, including the wide discretion 
regarding Military Commissions.  Youngstown had limited the 
President’s war-time power in some instances, by finding that 
the President did not have power to take private possession of 
property, but had left Quirin intact. 
In 2006, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court applied 
Justice Jackson’s twilight zone test in Youngstown to evaluate 
Military Commissions.  It found that the President’s Executive 
Order calling for Military Commissions required specific 
endorsement from Congress—something not required under 
Quirin.  It invited Congress to pass legislation endorsing the 
President’s play for Military Commissions.227 
The President has only one alternative.  Just as the Court in 
Hamdan invited Congress to endorse President Bush’s Military 
Commissions plan, Congress can endorse President Obama’s 
plan.  President Obama must persuade Congress to amend (or do 
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away with) the Military Commissions Act of 2006.  But, he 
cannot act alone.  Disregarding existing, controlling federal law 
all together runs afoul of Youngstown and Hamdan and violates 
“the essence of the principle of separation of powers,” just as 
Truman violated the separation of powers in the Youngstown 
steel seizure context.228  What impact the Boumediene case may 
have on President Obama’s decisions regarding Military 
Commissions remains to be seen. 
VII.  PRESIDENTIAL ORDERS & UNLAWFUL COMMAND INFLUENCE 
President Obama’s Executive Order halting military trials 
may amount to unlawful command influence.  President Obama 
directed the Secretary of Defense to refrain from charging any 
additional detainees under the Military Commissions Act of 
2006, and halted trials already underway.229  His order also 
declared: “Nothing in this order shall prejudice the authority of 
the Secretary of Defense to determine the disposition of any 
detainees not covered by this order.”230  But saying it does not 
make it so. 
Because meddling commanders threaten the independence of 
Military Trials, the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) 
makes certain levels of command influence illegal.231  It is a 
punishable crime, and (among other things) prohibits any 
Commander from influencing an action of any military 
tribunal.232 
Congress included the same prohibition in the recently 
enacted Rules for Military Commissions.  Under the Military 
Commissions Act, it is unlawful for any official to improperly 
influence the action of Military Commissions in the Global War 
on Terror.233  In fact, the Military Commissions Rule is actually 
 
 228  See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 660 (1952) (Burton, 
J., concurring). 
 229  Exec. Order No. 13492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 22, 2009).  Section 7 states: 
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more broad than the Courts Martial Rule because it covers “all 
persons” and specifies that “no person may attempt” to 
unlawfully, or by unauthorized means, influence the Military 
Commission.234  The Courts Martial Rule only applies to “all 
persons subject to the code.”235 
Courts consistently recognize the deleterious impact of 
unlawful command influence on military trials.  One court called 
it the “mortal enemy of military justice.”236  Another referred to it 
as “a malignancy that eats away at the fairness of our military 
justice system.”237  Military Courts have interpreted the crime of 
unlawful command influence to include even the appearance of 
unlawful command influence.238  Tests include “whether a 
reasonable member of the public . . . would have a loss of 
confidence in the military justice system and believe it to be 
unfair.”239  Another query is whether the command influence 
placed “intolerable strain on public perception” of the military 
justice system.”240  Figuratively speaking, the test for unlawful 
command influence asks whether the Commander was “brought 
into the deliberation room”—whether he controlled the trial or 
the court.241 
After President Obama’s order to halt military trials, most 
judges and prosecutors in Guantanamo Bay dutifully complied 
although the statute gives no president the power to order 
prosecutors to ask for, or order a judge to grant, a continuance.242  
They accepted the unlawful command influence. 
Prosecutors filed motions to stop the trials, and judges 
granted them, with one lone exception.243  Army Colonel Judge 
James Pohl, who was presiding over the prosecution of al-
Nashiri, the alleged mastermind of The Cole bombing in 2000, 
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refused to stop the trial.244  Pohl said that the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006 governed the proceedings, and stated 
that, “[t]he public interest in a speedy trial will be harmed by the 
delay in the arraignment.”245  Pohl also stated: “The Commission 
is bound by the law as it currently exists not as it may change in 
the future.”246  Judge Pohl pointed out that the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006 gave the military judges “sole 
authority” to grant delays once charges had been referred for 
trial.247 
On the heels of his refusal, the Pentagon issued a statement.  
Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell said that “Pohl would soon be 
told to comply with Obama’s executive order.”248  He went on to 
explain, “all I can really tell you is that this department will be in 
full compliance with the president’s executive order.  There’s [sic] 
no if, ands or buts about that.”249  He then added, “while that 
executive order is in force and effect, trust me that there will be 
no proceedings continuing, down at Gitmo, with Military 
Commissions.”250  As predicted, a few days later, the charges 
against al-Nashiri were dropped.251  Colonel Pohl was not 
involved in that decision.252  Normally, unlawful command 
influence occurs in the shadows.  This time it occurred while the 
Pentagon celebrated it in a press release. 
These Pentagon orders make clear that President Obama 
was not just “brought into the deliberation room,” but that he 
blocked the deliberation room door and sent the judge and jurors 
home.  The Executive Order left no room for Judge Pohl to 
exercise judicial discretion or to issue rulings in a case before 
him.  This interference undermined the integrity of the judicial 
system and is precisely why the military has laws prohibiting 
unlawful command influence. 
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Military Courts have repeatedly held that almost any 
interference with military trials amounts to unlawful command 
influence.  For instance, one court found that a hospital 
commander committed unlawful command influence when he 
criticized witnesses (after the military trial was over) for 
testifying on behalf of alleged drug offenders.253 
Another court held that an Army General committed 
unlawful command influence when he told his subordinate 
officers that they should not recommend a trial or bad conduct 
discharge for a soldier, and then testify that that same convicted 
solder is a “good soldier” at the sentencing hearing.254  The 
General believed that the two positions were inconsistent.  The 
court found unlawful command influence and said: “ . . . in this 
area [unlawful command influence] the band of permissible 
activity by the commander is narrow, and the risks of 
overstepping its boundaries are great.  Interference with the 
discretionary functions of subordinates is particularly 
hazardous.”255 
In another case, after a military judge ruled leniently in 
three cases, the Judge Advocate General of the Air Force, and 
other senior JAG Officers, launched an informal inquiry into 
whether the judge had been subjected to unlawful command 
influence by his chain of command.  The U.S. Court of Military 
Appeals barred such inquiries and said that only investigations 
that were “outside the adversary process” and “made by an 
independent judicial Commission established in strict accordance 
with the guidance contained in section 9.1(a) of the AGA 
Standards . . . ” were permitted.  The court was concerned that 
the inquiry itself could amount to unlawful command 
influence.256 
In United States v. Lewis, a military prosecutor and his 
supervising lawyer (the Staff Judge Advocate, or SJA) 
aggressively sought to recuse a Marine Corps judge on the 
grounds that the judge had a personal relationship with the 
defendant’s lawyer (who was a former Marine).  The prosecutor 
alleged that the judge and civilian defense counsel had interacted 
socially, even while the trial was ongoing.257  The prosecutor 
introduced evidence that the military judge and defense counsel 
were seen together at a play, while the case was ongoing.258  
 
 253  United States v. Sullivan, 26 M.J. 442 (CMA 1988). 
 254  United States v. Treakle, 18 M.J. 646 (A.C.M.R. 1984). 
 255  Id. at 653. 
 256  United States v. Ledbetter, 2 M.J. 37, 42 (C.M.A. 1976). 
 257  United States v. Lewis, 63 M.J. 405, 408 (C.A.A.F. 2006). 
 258  Id. at 409. 
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When initially questioned about attending the play with defense 
counsel, the Judge failed to disclose that interaction.  Later, she 
explained that it had “slipped [her] mind.”259  She then conceded 
that she and the defense counsel had “occasional social 
interaction with no discussions of any military trials pending 
before me.”260 
In addition to the social relationship, the prosecutor also 
pointed out that the defense counsel had a practice of sending 
copies of e-mails about pending cases to this particular judge and 
that the defense counsel had previously expressed a preference 
for this military judge in other cases.261 
The prosecutor also introduced evidence that the judge had 
been voir dired about her personal relationship with defense 
counsel in several other cases.262  In one instance, after being voir 
dired by the prosecutor in an earlier case, the judge told a 
colleague that she felt she had been put “through an inquisition” 
and that “it would take . . . a few days to get back on good terms 
with the government.”263  The prosecutor introduced this prior 
statement as evidence of partiality toward this particular defense 
counsel.264 
The military judge at first denied the prosecution’s motion to 
recuse.  The prosecutor sought a three-day continuance to 
determine whether the government would appeal the ruling.  The 
judge denied that request.  The prosecutor then amended the 
request and asked for only a three hour continuance in order to 
 
 259  Id. 
 260  Id. 
 261  Id. at 408–09. 
 262  Id. at 409. 
 263  Id. at 408.  
 264  The prosecution’s motion for refusal went as follows: 
Ma’am, at this time taken all of the facts that have come to light during this 
inquiry, your previous involvement with the companion cases, having worked 
with Colonel [JS] in the past, having a social relationship limited to 
interactions at the barn, as well as the fact that defense counsel in the Neff 
case apparently received statements from the assistant civilian defense counsel 
expressing in the Scamahorn case displeasure with the way that you had been 
voir dired in the Curiel case; also the fact that civilian defense counsel in this 
case has made a habit of CC’ing you on electronic mail messages which 
contained disputed and contested substantial issues relating to suborning 
perjury, discovery issues, and making recommendations to you as to what 
would be an appropriate resolution for failure to comply with pretrial 
milestones: All of that taken together, ma’am, would you agree that creates an 
appearance of impartiality [sic] that a reasonable person might perceive with 
respect to this case, ma’am? 
Id. at 408–09. 
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seek a stay of the proceedings.  The judge denied that request, 
too.265 
Ultimately, after consulting with other judges in the circuit, 
the judge changed her mind and recused herself.266  She stated, 
“I’m emotional about this”267 and explained that she was 
“mortally disappointed in the professional community that is 
willing to draw such slanderous conclusions from so little 
information.”268  She went on to explain, “I now find myself 
second guessing every decision in this case.  Did I favor the 
government to protect myself from further assault?  Did I favor 
the accused to retaliate against the government[?]”269  She held 
prosecutors responsible for her inability to be objective, stating 
“ . . . my emotional reaction to the slanderous conduct of the SJA 
has invaded my deliberative process on the motions.”270 
After the sitting judge recused herself, the military assigned 
a new judge, LTC FD.271  Incredibly, he accepted the case only to 
almost immediately recuse himself, too.  What were his reasons 
for recusal?  “The manner in which [trial counsel] handled the 
voir dire in this case particularly offends me.”272  He 
characterized the SJA’s voir dire of the former judge as a “crass, 
sarcastic, and scurrilous characterization of the social interaction 
between Major [CW] and Ms. [JS] . . . ”  He explained that he 
could “neither understand nor set aside” the “ignorance, 
prejudice, and paranoia on the part of the government.”273 
But, how, exactly did the diligent voir dire of a former judge 
prejudice the present judge?  It seems that the military judges 
mounted a united, public, front against voir dire directed at 
them.  One can only understand this as a warning to JAG 
prosecutors that judges are off limits.  Arguably, it is this united 
front that taints the fairness of military trials—not prosecutors 
doing their jobs. 
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces 
held that the prosecutor and the SJA’s diligent attempts to 
recuse the judge amounted to unlawful command influence.274  
Without citing any evidence that the prosecutor, or SJA, were 
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 274  Id. at 414–15. 
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actually influenced by their chain of command, or acted out of 
anything but professional diligence, the Court of Appeals found 
unlawful command influence.  It said: 
[t]o the extent that the SJA, a representative of the convening 
authority, advised the trial counsel in the voir dire assault on the 
military judge and to the extent that his unprofessional behavior as a 
witness and inflammatory testimony created a bias in the military 
judge, the facts establish clearly that there was unlawful command 
influence on the court-martial.275 
That is—the Court simply held that if the prosecutors acted 
as puppets for the Command then unlawful command influence 
occurred.  But, it failed to answer the dispositive question of 
whether the Commander was at all involved. 
The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces agreed with the 
lower court, also without citing any evidence that the prosecutors 
were motivated by any commander.  It simply said, “a reasonable 
observer would have significant doubt about the fairness of this 
court-martial in light of the Government’s conduct with respect 
to MAJ CW [the military judge].”276  It did not explain why a 
reasonable observer would reach such a conclusion. 
It is unclear how a prosecutor aggressively seeking to recuse 
a judge, whom the prosecutor reasonably believed was biased, 
amounts to unlawful command influence.  How would it lead one 
to believe that the procedures were not fair?  In fact, the opposite 
is true.  One would think that a military prosecutor facing off 
against a military judge in open court demonstrates that the 
proceedings are fair; that they are not orchestrated; that both 
prosecutors and defense counsel diligently represent their clients, 
despite the fact that they all work for the military. 
Whether one agrees, or disagrees, with the holding in Lewis, 
one cannot deny the fact that its holding would prohibit 
President Obama from stopping military trials already 
underway.  If minor interferences with a trial amount to 
unlawful command influence, then surely halting a trial 
altogether qualifies as well.  If the mere theoretical possibility 
that a Commander encouraged a prosecutor to recuse a judge 
amounts to unlawful interference, then certainly a President 
actually halting a trial and involuntarily removing the judge 
qualifies as well.  Is there any greater “interference” than 
ordering a judge to stop a trial? 
 
 275  Id. at 412 (emphasis added). 
 276  Id. at 415. 
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Ironically, one of the sitting judges [Judge Susan Crawford] 
who decided the Lewis277 case later yielded to, and facilitated, 
President Obama’s order to halt Military Commissions that were 
already underway in Guantanamo Bay.  Only a few months after 
Lewis, Secretary Robert Gates designated Judge Crawford as the 
convening authority for Military Commissions.278  Her position as 
the convening authority meant that she would supervise the 
office of Military Commissions, review and approve charges, and 
appoint members of the Military Commission, along with other 
duties.279 
When Judge Pohl would not yield to President Obama’s 
order to halt the trials, Judge Crawford intervened and 
dismissed the charges against al-Nashiri, who was the alleged 
mastermind of the Cole Bombing.280  The case was not before her. 
The same Pentagon official who said approximately one week 
before the dismissal that “Pohl would soon be told to comply” 
confirmed that Crawford yielded to the President’s order.  He 
stated, “[i]t was her decision, but it reflects the fact that the 
president had issued an executive order which mandates that the 
Commissions be halted . . . .”281  On the heels of her decision in 
Lewis, in which she took a rigid stand against unlawful command 
influence with relatively weak facts, she yielded to President 
Obama’s order to halt military trials.282 
That is—the same Judge who believes that diligent voir dire 
directed at military judges amounts to unlawful command 
influence, holds different, and inconsistent, views when the 
command influence originates with a sitting President.  The 
precise reason for the inconsistency is unclear.  However, one 
reasonable explanation for the inconsistency is that, perhaps, 
Judge Crawford herself was a victim of unlawful command 
influence.  That is—perhaps she can identify unlawful command 
influence, but she cannot resist it when the order comes from the 
highest commander—the President and Commander in Chief.  
Indeed, that is why the Military prohibits unlawful command 
influence, and defines it broadly. 
 
 277  Id. at 406; see also News Release, U.S. Department of Defense, Seasoned judge 
Tapped to head Detainee Trials, www.defenselink.mil/REleases/ 
Reelase.aspx?ReleaseID=10493. 
 278  News Release, supra note 277. 
 279  Id. 
 280  Id. 
 281  Charges Dropped in USS Cole Terror Trial, MSNBC, Feb. 5, 2009, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29042139 (last visited Mar. 25, 2009), quoting Geoff 
Morrell. 
 282  Id. 
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In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court criticized 
President Bush for changing the rules governing Military 
Commissions after the trials were already underway.  It said that 
changing the rules “at the whim of the Executive” was 
“irregular.”283  Surely, if the Supreme Court thinks that changing 
the rules mid-trial is unfair, it would also conclude that halting 
the trials all together in violation of a governing federal statute is 
also unfair. 
CONCLUSION 
Over time, the procedures that govern military trials have 
evolved to provide substantially greater due process.  For 
instance, the Hunter Commission, which tried Lincoln’s 
assassins, afforded defendants few procedural protections, FDR 
offered more protections and the Guantanamo Bay Military 
Commissions afford defendants even greater procedural 
protections.  These protections now include the right to remain 
silent, protections against double jeopardy, appointed counsel, 
and extensive appellate opportunities, including an appeal to the 
U.S. Supreme Court. 
But, despite the evolution of procedural protections, history 
shows that Presidents nonetheless have consistently interfered 
with Military Commissions.  For instance, President Johnson 
disregarded the Hunter Commission’s plea for clemency to spare 
Mary Surratt’s life, suspended the writ of habeas corpus, and 
ordered her immediately executed.  During the War of 1812, 
President Jackson disregarded a Military Commission’s acquittal 
of a defendant and ordered the defendant to remain in jail.  
During WWII, FDR made it known to the Supreme Court that he 
planned to execute the Nazi saboteurs, no matter what the Court 
decided in the Quirin case.  The Court yielded to his authority 
and validated the findings of the Military Commission. 
In the Global War on Terror, President Obama has halted 
Military Commissions in violation of the Military Commissions 
Act, and possibly in violation of the prohibition against unlawful 
command influence.  Executive interference with military trials 
undermines their legitimacy and cuts against the evolution of 
procedural protections. What good are procedural protections if 
the Executive, acting alone, can undo them?  What good are 
independent judges when a President can unseat them, or order 
cases before them to be dismissed? 
What is historically different about what is occurring today 
 
 283  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 633 n.65 (2006). 
ROTUNDA 10/14/2009 6:37 PM 
2009] From The Civil War To The War on Terror 487 
is that the Supreme Court is taking a more active role in war 
time matters to police Military Commissions.  In Boumediene, it 
stood firm against the President, even though he acted in concert 
with Congress.  In Hamdan, it found that President Bush’s 
Executive Order calling for Military Commissions did not grant 
authority for them—despite the fact that it had previously found, 
in Quirin, that FDR’s virtually identical order did.  It invited 
Congress to pass laws specifically authorizing Military 
Commissions.  But, when Congress did that, the Supreme Court 
in Boumediene invalidated some aspects of those rules. 
What impact Boumediene will have on President Obama’s 
decisions, and on future Presidential decisions, remains to be 
seen.  Will its new level of involvement help to curtail unlawful 
command influence with Military Commissions?  Perhaps, but we 
cannot know for sure.  One thing is clear: the Supreme Court’s 
involvement in war time decisions stands in stark contrast to the 
way it responded in previous wars, including during the Civil 
War and World War II.  Only time will tell whether the Supreme 
Court’s increased involvement regarding Military Commissions is 
for better or for worse; or whether unlawful command influence 
will continue to be a constant feature of Military Commissions. 
 
